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Young v. Fordice: CHALLENGING DUAL REGISTRATION
UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Brenda Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1890, as Reconstruction ended and the federal government withdrew from
protecting the civil rights of blacks in the South, Mississippi held a constitutional
convention that became a model for southern states seeking to disfranchise their
black citizens. The most notorious disfranchising provisions adopted by the
1890 Constitutional Convention were literacy tests and poll taxes,1 but the inge-
nuity of those seeking to foreclose the exercise of black political power extended
further. Among the inventions of the 1890 Convention was a provision fostering
racial discrimination in local elections, the "dual registration" requirement.2
Under this provision, registration with the circuit clerk of the county alone was
insufficient to qualify a citizen to vote in municipal elections. Instead, to vote in
municipal elections, a citizen first had to register with the circuit clerk and then
register again with the municipal clerk.'
Like other facially neutral registration barriers adopted by Mississippi, this
dual registration requirement suppressed voting by black Mississippians in
municipal elections to a far greater degree than that of whites,4 and it continued
to do so long after more overt barriers such as the literacy test and poll taxes
were outlawed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In 1987, when a federal court
struck down the final vestiges of this dual registration requirement as a violation
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,6 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the holding
in 1991,7 voting rights advocates believed they had seen the last of this holdover
from an earlier, shameful era in Mississippi history. They were wrong.
* Managing Attorney, National Voting Rights Institute, Boston, Massachusetts; B.A., 1979, Bryn Mawr
College; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School. At the time of the litigation described in this article, the author was the
Director of the Voting Rights Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C. The
views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law or the National Voting Rights Institute..
1. See FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPowERMErr IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965, at 27
(1990).
2. Id. at 205. See also Mississippi Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (N.D.
Miss. 1987), aff'd, 932 E2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991).
3. PARKER, supra note 1, at 205.
4. "Substantial numbers of black voters apparently were not informed of the dual registration requirement
when they registered to vote with the circuit clerks or were otherwise unaware of the requirement .
PARKER, supra note 1, at 206. As recounted in PUSH v. Alain:
In the March 10, 1987 municipal Democratic primary election in the City of Marks, Mississippi,
56 voters who had registered to vote with the Quitman County Circuit Clerk prior to August 3,
1984, but who had not registered with the Marks Municipal Clerk, were required to cast affidavit
ballots by election officials. These affidavit ballots were later rejected and not counted by the
Marks Municipal Democratic Committee. All 56 of these voters were black. In that election, two
black candidates for the board of aldermen lost by voter margins less than the number of affidavit
ballots that were rejected.
PUSH, 674 F. Supp. at 1255. See also Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2643 (1981) (testimony of
Robert M. Walker, Mississippi Field Director, NAACP, describing similar practices in numerous Mississippi
localities).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
7. PUSH, 674 F Supp. at 1245.
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Starting in 1995, only four years after the Fifth Circuit's decision confirming
the illegality of Mississippi's earlier dual registration requirement, Mississippi
again had a dual registration system. The occasion for resurrecting dual registra-
tion presented itself when Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act
of 1993, or "NVRA" (more popularly known as the "Motor-Voter" law), which
requires states to make voter registration available at agencies that serve the pub-
lic, such as drivers' license offices, public assistance offices, military recruiting
offices, and other public agencies.8 Congress made the requirements of the
NVRA applicable only to registration for federal elections, leaving states the
option of melding the NVRA's registration procedures with those governing reg-
istration for state and local elections.9 However, Congress was also careful to
provide that "[n]othing in this subchapter authorizes or requires conduct that is
prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965."10 This meant, among other things,
that states such as Mississippi with a history of racial discrimination in voting
would be required to seek preclearance from the United States Justice
Department or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
any procedures they adopted in implementing the NVRA-a process known as
"Section 5 preclearance."'"
Because the reforms required by the NVRA are generally popular with the
public and maintaining dual registration systems for federal and state elections is
cumbersome, inefficient, and potentially suspect under the Voting Rights Act, it
was widely anticipated that most states would permit NVRA registrants to vote
in all elections. In forty-nine of the fifty states, that is precisely what has hap-
pened: voters who register at drivers' license offices and other public agencies
under the provisions of the NVRA are also permitted to vote in state and local
elections. 2 Mississippi, however, not only insisted that NVRA registrants would
have to register again to vote in state and local elections, but it also refused to
seek section 5 preclearance from the United States Department of Justice when it
instituted this dual registration system for NVRA registrants. 3
As has so often happened in Mississippi, a lawsuit was necessary to compel the
State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Lawsuits can be marvelous vehi-
cles for accomplishing, after long and costly struggle, things that never should
have been in doubt in the first place. In the case of Young v. Fordice,"4 the sur-
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-1973gg-10 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
9. Young v. Fordice, No. 95-CV-197, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995) (noting that states have discre-
tion "to meld the NVRA requirements into the existing state system for registration of voters").
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(d)(2).
11. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
12. Illinois attempted to implement a dual system as well, with NVRA registrants restricted to voting in fed-
eral elections, but the requirement of dual registration was subsequently invalidated on state constitutional and
statutory grounds. Orr v. Edgar, 670 N.E.2d 1243 (11. App. 1 Dist. 1996).
13. Throughout the litigation over Mississippi's implementation of the NVRA, the State insisted that there
was no "dual registration" requirement because it was still possible for citizens to become registered for all pur-
poses as long as they used the state forms. That semantic dodge ignores the fact that all persons who register to
vote at drivers' license agencies and other NVRA sites, as permitted by the NVRA, must, indeed, register again
under separate procedures to be eligible for all elections. On election day, these NVRA registrants appear on a
separate poll list and receive separate (and restricted) ballots. To call this anything other than a dual registration
system is to blink at reality.
14. 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997).
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prising thing is not so much that Mississippi citizens won a unanimous Supreme
Court decision declaring that the State needed section 5 preclearance before
implementing dual NVRA registration procedures, but that this result required
two years of litigation and an appeal to the Supreme Court at all. Young v.
Fordice is nevertheless significant because it presented the Supreme Court's first
opportunity to examine and interpret the NVRA, and because, in an era when the
Supreme Court is otherwise cutting back on protections for minority voting
rights, it affirmed an expansive interpretation of the preclearance requirement of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
II. VOTER REGISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI PRIOR TO THE NVRA
The history of Mississippi's voting laws is a history of racial discrimination
against the state's black citizens that has gradually, and with painful delay, been
curbed by stringent application of the guarantees of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. Mississippi has employed nearly every disfranchising stratagem ever
devised to deprive black citizens of the right to vote: poll taxes, literacy tests,
lengthy residency requirements, tests of "good moral character," white primaries,
publication of registrants' names to facilitate retaliation, prohibitions on registra-
tion outside of a county clerk's office, re-registration programs, and dual registra-
tion requirements."5
Mississippi's history of discrimination in voting was a primary impetus for
Congress' enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.16 Because of this history,
Mississippi was one of the seven states originally designated in their entirety as
jurisdictions covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,17 which requires cov-
ered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance from the United States Attorney General
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before imple-
menting any changes in voting practices or procedures. 8 Mississippi's continued
resistance to the Act's guarantees also has been an important consideration in
Congress' several extensions of the Act since 1965.19
As already noted, from 1892 to 1987, Mississippi maintained, in one form or
another, a requirement of "dual registration"-separate registration with both the
circuit clerk and municipal clerk-that had the purpose and effect of dispropor-
tionately denying black citizens the full opportunity to vote in Mississippi
municipal elections.2" By 1984, Mississippi was the only state in the nation still
requiring dual registration.21
After a federal court struck down the dual registration requirement as racially
discriminatory in 1987, the Mississippi Legislature enacted remedial legislation
which the district court approved in 1989.22 Thus, at the time the NVRA was
15. See PUSH, 674 E Supp. 1245, 1250-52 (N.D. Miss. 1987); PARKER, supra note I at 26-29, 185, 205-06.
16. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-13, 315 (1966).
17. Seeid. at318.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
19. See PARKER, supra note 1, at 180-81.
20. PUSH, 674 F. Supp. at 1252, 1255, 1268.
21. Id. at 1252.
22. Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 717 E Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. Miss. 1989), afftd,
932 E2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991).
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enacted in 1993, Mississippi's statutes provided for a unified system of voter reg-
istration, such that when qualified persons completed a single registration in
their county of residence, they were eligible to vote in all local, county, state, and
federal elections. 3
III. Mississippi's RESPONSE TO THE NVRA
Mississippi, like most other states, had to make changes in some of its registra-
tion and record-keeping procedures in order to comply with the NVRA. The
NVRA, unlike Mississippi law, requires that citizens be given the opportunity to
register at drivers' license offices, public assistance agencies, and other agencies
serving the public. 24 There are other differences as well. 25 Congress delayed the
effective date of the NVRA until January 1, 1995, for most states,26 so that states
would have a full opportunity to prepare for proper implementation of the law.
As the January 1, 1995, implementation date approached, several states led by
Republican governors brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
NVRA, claiming that the imposition of an unfunded federal mandate violated
principles of federalism guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 7 Mississippi, to the surprise of some, did not follow that course.
Instead, in the period leading up to January 1995, Mississippi took elaborate
steps preparing to implement the NVRA for all elections-federal, state, and
local.
First, Governor Kirk Fordice issued an executive order that named Secretary of
State Dick Molpus as "the chief state election officer for the purposes of compli-
ance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993" and created a National
Voter Registration Act Implementation Committee, which had the responsibility
of ensuring Mississippi's compliance with the Act. The Implementation
Committee included the chairs of the Mississippi House and Senate election
committees, representatives of the Mississippi Attorney General's office, the
Governor's office, the Secretary of State's office, and representatives of several
other state agencies and organizations.
Starting in February 1994, the Secretary of State's office, in conjunction with
the Governor's Implementation Committee, developed written materials and reg-
istration forms to be used by circuit clerks and other local officials in implement-
23. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11(1990).
24. Compare MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-47(4)(b) (1990 & Supp. 1996) with 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3 (1994)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5 (1994).
25. For example, the Mississippi mail-in registration form requires the signature of an attesting witness who
is already registered to vote in the applicant's county and requires more information than is necessary for deter-
mining voter eligibility and maintaining registration rolls, See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-47 (3) (1990 & Supp.
1996), all of which are prohibited by the NVRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-7(b)(l), (b)(3) (1994). In addition,
Mississippi law permits the purging of voters who have not voted in four years at the discretion of local election
officials and permits purges based on local officials' determination, without notice to the voter, that the voter is
no longer qualified under state law. MIss. CODE ANN §§ 23-15-153 (1990 & Supp. 1996), 23-15-159 (1990).
The NVRA prohibits purges for non-voting and requires written confirmation of information before it is used
to purge a voter from the rolls. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(d) (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg note (1994)
27. To date, none of the lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the NVRA have been successful. See,
e.g., Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 E3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996);
Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 E3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995).
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ing the revised registration and purging procedures prompted by the NVRA.28
None of these new procedures and registration forms, which were to be imple-
mented as of January 1, 1995, made any distinction between registration for fed-
eral elections and registration for other elections, nor suggested that the new pro-
cedures would result in eligibility only for federal elections."
The Governor's Implementation Committee also developed legislation to con-
form Mississippi's practices to the NVRA generally, and influential legislators
stated their support for the legislation. The legislation, however, was not intro-
duced until the January 1995 legislative session, which was scheduled to run
through the end of March, even though the NVRA was required to be imple-
mented starting on January 1, 1995. Although the State, throughout the subse-
quent litigation, attempted to blame the Justice Department and an official in the
Secretary of State's office for causing "confusion" in the State's implementation
of the NVRA, the real problem was the State's failure to finalize its NVRA legis-
lation in advance of the deadline for implementation and failure to seek preclear-
ance under section 5 in a timely manner. The Justice Department was not
responsible for either of those problems, and, as we shall see, the Secretary of
State's office was the only state agency that correctly recognized the necessity of
obtaining section 5 preclearance for the State's implementation plan.
IV THE IMPACT OF THE SECTION 5 PRECLEARANCE REQUIREMENT
In the latter part of 1994, the United States Department of Justice learned that
Mississippi planned to implement administratively its new NVRA registration
procedures starting January 1, 1995, although none of the State's implementation
plans, revised forms, or training materials, which described substantial changes
in voter registration procedures, had been submitted for section 5 preclearance.
This created a serious problem because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that any changes in the voting practices of a covered state, whether implemented
by legislation or administratively, are unlawful unless they have first received the
required section 5 preclearance.3" The purpose of section 5 is to require an
advance determination that any proposed changes in voting practices are free of
any racially discriminatory effect or purpose. If section 5 review is not secured
28. The materials included a manual to guide the registration activities of these public officials and employ-
ees and a set of instructions to be used by personnel at the drivers' license bureaus, public assistance agencies,
and other offices designated to conduct registrations. They also included new voter registration forms to be
used at agencies and a redesigned mail-in registration form that conformed to NVRA requirements and elimi-
nated the requirement of an attesting witness. Joint App. at 26-66, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997)
(No. 95-2031).
29. To the contrary, the new registration form for use at the drivers' license agency stated: "[Y]ou may
apply to register to vote in Mississippi while renewing your driver license. If you would like to apply to register
to vote, complete Sections 1 and 2 of this form... ?' Id. at 45 (emphasis added). Similarly, the new form to be
used at public assistance agencies asked: "If you are not registered to vote where you now live, would you like
to register to vote here today?" Id. at 46. The revised mail-in form contained similar language, stating: "If you
are not registered to vote where you now live, you can use this form to register to vote or report that your name
or address have changed." Id. at 50. Nothing in these forms advised the applicants that their registrations
would be invalid for state and local elections.
30. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 653 (1991).
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in advance of implementing the change, the prophylactic purposes of section 5
are defeated.31
Although the Secretary of State had initially planned to submit the new proce-
dures to the Justice Department for preclearance only after the Legislature had
enacted the proposed NVRA legislation, that would have resulted in a violation
of section 5 because the state clearly planned to implement the new procedures
starting January 1, 1995, without awaiting legislative action. The Department of
Justice therefore wrote to the Mississippi Secretary of State in December 1994
explaining that preclearance of the new procedures and forms was necessary
prior to their implementation.32
The Secretary of State's office complied with the Justice Department's request
by submitting to the Department of Justice materials setting forth the NVRA
practices that were to be implemented "prior to the passage of the state legisla-
tion"33 and formally requesting preclearance for the implementation plan as set
forth in the Secretary of State's November 1994 manual.34 The November 1994
manual described a set of registration and record-keeping procedures to be used
generally by circuit clerks and other election officials, with no provisions indicat-
ing that a separate set of registration requirements and procedures would be
maintained for state and local elections.3" On February 1, 1995, the United
States Attorney General, acting through the Department of Justice, granted pre-
clearance to the NVRA implementation plan submitted by the Secretary of
State.36
In the first few weeks of 1995, several thousand new voters were added to the
rolls through registration under the new NVRA procedures.37 These voters all
31. As the legislative history of section 5 explains: "Timely submission of proposed changes before their
implementation is the crucial threshold element of compliance with the law." S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 47 (1982), quoted in NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 175 n.19 (1985).
32. Joint App. at 105, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
33. Id. at 108 (Letter dated December 14, 1994, from Constance Slaughter-Harvey, Assistant Secretary of
State, Elections, and General Counsel, to Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
United States Department of Justice).
34. The submission letter stated:
[C]onsider this letter as a request for preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
Mississippi's plan to administratively implement the provisions of NVRA, in accordance with the
package of materials which were submitted to your office on December 5 and December 14, 1994.
In particular, please regard the publication dated November 1994 and entitled "The National Voter
Registration Act" as Mississippi's plan to administratively implement NVRA on January 1, 1995.
Id. at 109-14 (Letter dated December 20, 1994, from Constance Slaughter-Harvey, General Counsel to the
Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State, Elections, to Dave Hunter, Voting Section, United States
Department of Justice).
35. As noted above, the new voter registration forms that were included in the section 5 submission and that
were to be used beginning January 1, 1995, made no distinction between eligibility for state and federal elec-
tions. Further, among items under the heading "Current methods that will change" the manual included the
following statements: "'[T]he optional 4-year purge is prohibited,' [and] 'a registrant's name cannot be removed
solely for not voting."' Id. at 35. Again, these instructions did not suggest that the new limitations on voter
purges would apply only to federal elections.
36. Juris. Statement at 15a, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031) (Letter dated February
1, 1995, from John Tanner, Department of Justice, to Constance Slaughter-Harvey).
37. See Joint App. at 114, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031) (February 25, 1995,
Memorandum from Constance Slaughter-Harvey, Assistant Secretary of State, Elections, and General Counsel,
to Agency Representatives) (estimating that 4,000 citizens registered under NVRA since January I, 1995).
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registered under the assumption that they were registering for all elections, and
none were informed that their registration might be invalid for state and local
elections.'
V. MISSISSIPPI'S CHANGE TO A DUAL REGISTRATION SYSTEM
Unfortunately, on January 25, 1995, the NVRA legislation developed by the
Governor's Implementation Committee, which had been widely expected to pass,
was blocked by the action of State Senator Kay Cobb, the chair of the
Mississippi Senate Elections Committee. Senator Cobb, a member of the
Governor's Implementation Committee, had stated she would support the legisla-
tion,39 but on January 25, 1995, she tabled the bill, refusing to allow a committee
vote. 0 She later explained her position in part by focusing upon the registration
opportunities offered to welfare recipients under the NVRA, saying that people
"who 'care enough to go get their welfare and their food stamps, but not walk
across the street to the circuit clerk,' should not be accommodated."41 She also
cited the election of a Republican Congress in November 1994 and concerns
about "unfunded mandates," as reasons for opposing full implementation of the
NVRA.42 The Governor later announced that he, too, opposed implementation of
the NVRA for state and local elections, saying that the legislation "should be
called 'Welfare Voter"' rather than "Motor-Voter" 3 and contending that the fed-
eral government should not dictate Mississippi's registration procedures."
The State's belated decision to implement the NVRA for federal elections only,
rather than for all elections, changed the entire nature of its NVRA implementa-
tion plan. No one had anticipated that NVRA registration would be valid for
federal elections only, and the State certainly had never sought section 5 pre-
clearance for a dual registration system. To initiate this federal-election-only
NVRA plan, officials in the Mississippi Attorney General's and Secretary of
State's offices issued a memorandum on February 10, 1995, with instructions to
38. Young v. Fordice, No. 95-CV-197, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995) ("A few thousand ... citi-
zens were registered under NVRA procedures between January 1 and February 10 under the assumption of eli-
gibility for all elections.").
39. Grace Simmons, 'Motor Voter'No Good in State Races, CLARION LEDGER (Jackson), March 6, 1995, at
A5.
40. This was the last day that bills could be voted out of committee in the regular session. It was still possi-
ble, however, for the legislature to vote to suspend the rules and bring the bill to the floor. Thus, tabling the bill
in committee did not necessarily mean that the legislature could not act on the bill later in the session. See Joint
App. at 115, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031). Although the legislature would remain in
session for almost three more months, no vote to suspend the rules and bring the bill to the floor was taken.
41. Trouble Looms on Horizon for State S Motor Voter Law, DEMOCRAT (Natchez, Miss.), May 8, 1995.
42. Simmons, supra note 39.
43. See Fordice Stoops to Picking on Poor, COMMONWEALTH (Greenwood), May 6, 1997.
44. Editorial writers throughout the state criticized this attack on the so-called "welfare voter" law as a thin-
ly veiled appeal to racial prejudice. As noted by a Mississippi columnist, "since the 1960's and the evolution of
Lyndon Johnson's 'Great Society,' Mississippi and the South have become fertile ground for the myth of the
'Welfare Queen' and the popular notion that the word 'welfare' is interchangeable with the word 'black' in
political discourse." Sid Salter, Fordice Shouldn't Throw Rocks At the Poor, TIMES (DeSoto, Miss.), May 15,
1997. See also, e.g., It's Hard for Fordice to Go Forward with Foot in Mouth, SuN-HERALD (Biloxi-Gulfport),
reprinted in DAILY LEADER (Brookhaven, Miss.), May 7, 1997 (noting similarities between "racist rhetoric" of
invoking "welfare queens" and Fordice's use of "a similar slur to maintain a dual system of registration that
keeps voters segregated at the polls in Mississippi"); Fordice Stoops to Picking on Poor, supra note 43 (criticiz-
ing Fordice for "trying to feed on prejudice to make his case" against unified registration).
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election officials for implementing the NVRA on a restricted basis. The memo-
randum directed circuit clerks to "prepare two separate sets of voter registration
books and pollbooks, or [to] . . . 'flag' voters registered under NVRA on the
voter registration books and pollbooks to denote that they are . . . not presently
authorized to vote in state elections.""5 It also acknowledged that "[a]nyone who
has thus far registered under NVRA, or will do so in the future, may well assume
that they are eligible to vote in all elections," and asked circuit clerks to notify
NVRA registrants of their limited eligibility to vote and to provide "the opportu-
nity to register for state elections." 6
The result of these new procedures was the division of the electorate into two
classes of voters for the first time since the resolution of the PUSH v. A llain"7 liti-
gation. One group, who took advantage of registration opportunities at drivers'
license and other offices designated under the NVRA, were eligible only for fed-
eral elections; the other group, who registered with the circuit clerk under pre-
existing Mississippi procedures, were eligible to vote in all elections. There was
no difference between these two groups in terms of meeting the voter qualifica-
tion requirements of Mississippi law. NVRA registrants, just like other
Mississippi registrants, were required to be citizens of the United States, eighteen
years of age or older, mentally competent, residents for thirty days in the state,
county, supervisor's district, and municipality (if any) in which they wished to
vote, and free of convictions for a list of disqualifying crimes. 8 NVRA regis-
trants differed from other Mississippi voters only in what forms they filled out
and at what site they obtained a registration form.
Once the State made its belated decision to implement the NVRA only for fed-
eral elections, its next step should have been to submit this new NVRA plan to
the United States Attorney General for preclearance under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Even after the Department of
Justice formally advised the State that the voting practices described in the
State's February 10, 1995, memorandum were subject to the section 5 preclear-
ance requirement, 9 the State refused to submit its new federal-election-only
NVRA procedures for preclearance.
VI. THE LAWSUIT
Community groups and vo*ting rights advocates in Mississippi had been moni-
toring very closely the State's plans for implementing the NVRA. Although they
hoped and expected that the State would implement a unified NVRA plan, they
were also relying on the section 5 preclearance requirement as an important safe-
45. Juris. Statement at 22a, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031) (Memorandum dated
February 10, 1995, from Phil Carter, Assistant Attorney General, and Reese Partridge, Staff Attorney, Secretary
of State's Office, to Mississippi Circuit Clerks and Chairman, Mississippi County Elections Commission).
46. Id. at 21a.
47. 674 F Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987), afftd, 932 E2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991).
48. Compare Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11(1990) with, Apps. 44, 45, 46, 50, 63, 64, 65, 66 (oath set forth in
NVRA registration forms).
49. Juris. Statement at 24a, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031) (Letter dated February
16, 1995, from Elizabeth Johnson, Acting Chief, Voting Section, U.S. Department of Justice, to Sandra Murphy
Shelson, Special Assistant Attorney General, State of Mississippi).
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guard that would assure close scrutiny by the Justice Department if the State
attempted to go back to a discriminatory dual registration system in the course of
implementing the NVRA. What they did not initially expect was that the State
would simply defy the preclearance requirement altogether once it decided to
adopt a federal-election-only NVRA plan. That was a very disappointing devel-
opment, especially when one considers that not a single Supreme Court Justice
ultimately agreed that the State could properly forgo section 5 review of its
NVRA plan."0
Mississippi citizens have learned from long experience that they might as well
get over such disappointments fairly quickly and proceed at once to federal court.
On April 20, 1995, four citizens filed suit against the State, alleging that the
State had implemented changes in voting procedures in violation of section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act.51 This type of section 5 enforcement action is heard
before a three-judge federal district court, with a right of direct appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.52 In a section 5 enforcement proceeding, the juris-
diction of the three-judge district court is severely limited. The local three-judge
district court does not have jurisdiction to determine "whether the changes at
issue ... in fact resulted in impairment of the right to vote, or whether they were
intended to have that effect." 3 Those questions as to the merits of the proposed
changes are reserved for the United States Attorney General or the District Court
for the District of Columbia. The only questions for the court in a section 5
enforcement action are: "(1) whether a change is covered by § 5, (2) if the
change is covered, whether § 5's approval requirements have been satisfied, and
(3) if the requirements have not been satisfied, what relief is appropriate.""
To establish that Mississippi's federal-election-only NVRA plan was subject
to section 5, the complaint carefully alleged two ways in which the State's new
dual registration requirements constituted a change from prior practices. First,
the plaintiffs alleged that the procedures instituted in the State's February 10,
1995, memorandum,55 which established a federal-election-only NVRA system,
constituted changes in the State's registration procedures as compared to the uni-
tary voter registration system that was in effect in Mississippi prior to January 1,
1995.11 Second, they alleged that the dual registration procedures initiated
50. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997).
51. The named plaintiffs were Thomas Young, Reverend Rims Barber, and Richard L. Gardner who conduct
voter registration activities on behalf of the NAACP or minority voters generally, and Eleanor Faye Smith was
an unregistered public assistance recipient. Because the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law had
represented Mississippi voters in the lawsuit that struck down the State's prior dual registration requirement for
municipal elections, the Lawyers' Committee was one of the organizations that again agreed to represent the
plaintiffs in this new round of litigation. In addition to the author, the counsel for plaintiffs included Samuel L.
Walters of the Lawyers' Committee; A. Spencer Gilbert and William Manual of the Jackson, Mississippi firm
of Wise Carter Child & Caraway; Margaret Carey of the Center for Constitutional Rights in Greenville,
Mississippi; and Laughlin McDonald and Neil Bradley of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc.,
in Atlanta, Georgia.
52. 28 U.S.C.§ 1253 (1993).
53. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 181 (1985).
54. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 250 n.17 (1984). See also Lopez v. Monterey County, 117 S. Ct. 340,
349 (1996), City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 129 n.3 (1983).
55. See supra text accompanying note 45.
56. Complaint at 68, Young v. Fordice, No. 95-CV-197, slip op. (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995) (No. 95-2031).
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through the State's February 10, 1995, memorandum constituted changes in the
State's voting procedures as compared to the unitary NVRA system that had
received preclearance from the Justice Department on February 1, 1995.11 If
either of these propositions was correct, the State was in violation of section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act by implementing changes in its voting practices without
the required review and preclearance by the Justice Department or District of
Columbia District Court.
Throughout the litigation, the State largely ignored the former allegation and
aimed its arguments primarily at the latter. The State argued that no unitary
NVRA registration system was ever authorized by the state legislature, that the
Secretary of State had acted beyond his authority-or at least made a mistake-
in submitting any such unitary NVRA plan to the Justice Department for pre-
clearance, and that the Justice Department's February 1, 1995, preclearance of
this unitary plan therefore could not serve to make a unitary NVRA plan the
benchmark against which to measure the State's later adoption of a federal-elec-
tion-only NVRA plan. Although the plaintiffs strongly believed that the State's
implementation of a unitary NVRA system in early 1995 was highly significant
and did serve to establish a benchmark for section 5 purposes under Supreme
Court precedent, 8 they also recognized that the State's dual NVRA registration
plan would be in violation of section 5 even if the unitary NVRA system imple-
mented in early 1995 were totally disregarded. The State was required to obtain
preclearance for its federal-election-only NVRA plan at some point, and the only
section 5 submission that the State could point to was the Secretary of State's
submission of the unitary NVRA plan. If that submission was to be treated as a
nullity, the State was left with nothing demonstrating its compliance with the
section 5 preclearance requirement.
Thus, the more the Mississippi Attorney General criticized the Secretary of
State for taking "unauthorized" action in making a section 5 submission to the
Justice Department, the more the State undercut its own legal defense. The State
then had to argue either that section 5 preclearance was completely unnecessary
for any of the practices adopted in implementing the NVRA, or alternatively, that
the Justice Department's February 1, 1995, preclearance letter could somehow be
construed as granting preclearance to a federal-election-only NVRA plan that
was not announced by the State until February 10, 1995. Both of these argu-
ments were foreclosed by longstanding Supreme Court precedent.
In making the first argument, the State contended that section 5 prec!earance
was unnecessary because the state legislature had not made any changes in
Mississippi's own registration laws, but had merely taken administrative action to
57. Id. 69. The complaint also alleged, initially, that the State was violating the NVRA by refusing to offer
any voter registration opportunities at public assistance offices, even for federal elections. Before this count
was litigated, the State began offering registration opportunities at public assistance offices, and the plaintiffs
therefore eventually agreed to a voluntary dismissal of the NVRA claim.
58. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (holding that city's use of single-member districts for
municipal elections established a benchmark requiring city to seek preclearance for change to at-large elections,
even though single-member district elections were unauthorized under state law and city had changed to at-
large elections solely for purpose of complying with state law).
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implement the NVRA in compliance with federal law. 9 The section 5 preclear-
ance requirement, however, is not limited to state legislative enactments. The
express language of section 5 is broad and encompasses not only enacted laws
but any "standard, practice or procedure" with respect to voting, and any changes
that covered jurisdictions "shall enact or seek to administer."' If it were other-
wise, states could evade the requirements of section 5 at will simply by allowing
administrative agencies to issue directives requiring voting changes rather than
involving the legislature. Thus, in 1994, when the Secretary of State developed a
set of procedures for implementing the NVRA's requirements in Mississippi and
when the State Attorney General's and Secretary of State's offices issued their
memorandum on February 10, 1995, giving further directions for creating a fed-
eral-election-only NVRA system, all of the new practices and procedures that
were thereby implemented in Mississippi were subject to the preclearance
requirements of section 5. The new registration system was not exempt simply
because it was implemented administratively rather than through legislation.
The State's related argument, that preclearance was not required under section
5 because the changes made by the State were merely those required by the fed-
eral government under the NVRA, also was squarely inconsistent with governing
precedent. In Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court held that vot-
ing changes made by covered states are not exempt from preclearance even when
implemented in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act itself 1 In Allen,
the Virginia Board of Elections had issued a bulletin providing that illiterate per-
sons could receive assistance in casting write-in votes. 2 The State argued that
section 5 did not apply to the bulletin because it "was issued in an attempt to
comply with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act." 3 The Court rejected
Virginia's argument, explaining that "[t]o hold otherwise would mean that legis-
lation, allegedly passed to meet the requirements of the Act, would be exempted
from § 5 coverage--even though it would have the effect of racial discrimination.
It is precisely this situation [that] Congress sought to avoid in passing § 5." 64
Similarly, in McDaniel v. Sanchez, the Court ruled that even when a covered
jurisdiction adopts a redistricting plan to comply with the order of a federal court
in the course of voting rights litigation, the jurisdiction must obtain section 5 pre-
clearance before implementing the plan. These rulings are simply an outgrowth
59. As the State argued in a March 9, 1995, letter to the Justice Department, the State had "not initiated, nor
implemented any change affecting voting within the State, other than [the] implementation of the NVRA ....
The changes affecting voter registration most recently implemented by the State are those mandated by NVRA,
not any change initiated or instituted by the State .. " Juris. Statement at 117-18, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct.
1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (emphasis added). See Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
1186, 1223-1224 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("When the legislature passes a law, or an administrative
agency issues a policy directive, official action has unquestionably been taken in the name of the State.
Accordingly, voting changes administered by such entities have been governed consistently by § 5") (emphasis
added); Presley v. Etowah County Comm 'n, 502 U.S. 491, 501 (1992) ("[T]he scope of § 5 is expansive within
its sphere of operation. That sphere comprehends all changes to rules governing voting... .
61. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 565 n.29.
64. Id.
65. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 145-53 (1981).
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of the central principle that a local three-judge court does not have jurisdiction to
determine the true motivation for a proposed voting change because Congress
deliberately reserved that question for the Justice Department or District of
Columbia District Court to determine in the first instance.66
On this point, the State's arguments also were inaccurate as a factual matter. In
implementing the NVRA, the State exercised a great deal of discretion and made
numerous changes not directly required by the NVRA. For example, nothing in
the NVRA required the State to use misleading voter registration forms which
suggested that the voter would be registering for all purposes when in fact the
registration would be valid only for federal elections. Indeed, the State's basic
decision to abandon its previous unitary registration scheme and require dual
registration for NVRA registrants was not compelled by the NVRA because
states were perfectly free to allow NVRA registrants to vote in all elections.
Such discretionary choices, even if exercised within limits established by federal
law, require section 5 preclearance.6 7
The State's second major argument was that the Justice Department's February
1, 1995 preclearance letter could somehow be construed as granting preclearance
to a federal-election-only NVRA plan that was not announced by the State until
February 10, 1995. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that a
Justice Department preclearance determination is strictly limited to voting
changes that are identified clearly and unambiguously by the covered jurisdiction
in the submission it makes to the Justice Department.' Any ambiguity in the
scope of the preclearance request is construed against the submitting
jurisdiction.69 As the Court explained in Clark v. Roemer, "[t]he requirement that
the State identify each change is necessary if the Attorney General is to perform
his preclearance duties under § 5."10 The Justice Department reviews thousands
of submissions every year from jurisdictions covered by section 5 and must make
its determination on each submission within sixty days of the date when the sub-
mission is complete.71 This expedited administrative review would be impossible
if a preclearance letter were subject to broad interpretation covering matters not
specifically identified in the submission.
66. As the Court explained in Lopez v. Monterey County, 117 S. Ct. 340, 349 (1996):
Congress designed the preclearance procedure "to forestall the danger that local decisions to modify
voting practices will impair minority access to the electoral process." Congress chose to accomplish
this purpose by giving exclusive authority to pass on the discriminatory effect or purpose of an elec-
tion change to the Attorney General and to the District Court for the District of Columbia. As we
explained in McDaniel, "[blecause a large number of voting changes must necessarily undergo the
preclearance process, centralized review enhances the likelihood that recurring problems will be
resolved in a consistent and expeditious way."
Id. at 348 (citations omitted) (quoting McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130,149 (1981)).
67. See McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 153 (noting that the Voting Rights Act "requires that whenever a covered
jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people-no
matter what constraints have limited the choices available to them-the preclearance requirement of the Voting
Rights Act is applicable").
68. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991).
69. Clark, 500 U.S. at 659.
70. Id. at 658.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). See Clark, 500 U.S. at 658.
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The only section 5 submission reviewed by the Justice Department was the
Secretary of State's December 1994 submission of the unitary plan that the State
had originally developed to implement the NVRA. That request for preclearance
failed to identify at all, much less "with specificity,"" the many procedures that
were required to implement the dual NVRA registration system set forth in the
State's February 10, 1995, memorandum. Unlike the February 10, 1995, memo-
randum, the December 1994 submission included no procedures establishing a
two-tier system of voter registration and record-keeping, no provisions for sepa-
rate sets of voter purge procedures distinguishing NVRA registrants from state
registrants and no procedures for notifying NVRA registrants that they would be
eligible to vote only in federal elections. The Justice Department's February 1,
1995, preclearance letter did not, and could not, provide preclearance for
changes that were not part of the submission.
The State attempted to shift the burden of clarifying the submission to the
Justice Department, arguing that the Justice Department should have known that
Mississippi would wish to implement a federal-election-only NVRA plan once
the State's NVRA legislation was tabled in committee on January 25, 1995.
According to this argument, the Justice Department should not have considered
the State's section 5 submission of the unitary NVRA plan before the Legislature
enacted the plan. These arguments ignored the fact that state officials in
Mississippi had already begun implementing the NVRA on a unitary basis as of
January 1, 1995, without waiting for the Legislature to act. It was hardly unrea-
sonable for the Justice Department to review and preclear procedures that the
State itself had already started implementing. Indeed, the State's actions in early
1995 were clearly illegal until the preclearance letter was issued. Furthermore,
the State took no action to withdraw or revise its submission after the legislation
was tabled.73 If the Justice Department had refused to act on the pending section
5 submission, and the Legislature then had revived and enacted the NVRA legis-
lation later in its 1995 session, the State would have faced an entirely different
set of problems because of the lengthy period during which registration had gone
forward without preclearance. Had that scenario materialized, the State no doubt
would have complained indignantly about the Justice Department's delay in
granting preclearance to the unified plan.74
72. Clark, 500 U.S. at 658.
73. In fact, before the Justice Department issued its preclearance determination, the Department contacted
the Mississippi Attorney General concerning the submission, and confirmed that the Mississippi Attorney
General had no objection to the Justice Department's consideration of the Secretary of State's submission. See
Transcript of Hearing Before Three-Judge District Court at 87, Young v. Fordice, No. 95-CV-197 (S.D. Miss.
July 24, 1997) (No. 95-2031).
74. Furthermore, the Justice Department did not violate its own regulations in considering the section 5 sub-
mission prior to enactment of state legislation, as the State contended. The regulation in question provides that
the Attorney General "will not consider on the merits ... [a]ny proposal for a change affecting voting submit-
ted prior to final enactment or administrative decision." 28 C.F.R. § 51.22 (1994) (emphasis added). The
Secretary of State's submission clearly advised the United States Attorney General that state election officials
were planning to implement the procedures set forth in the November 1994 NVRA manual as of January 1,
1995, without awaiting legislative action. Thus, in addressing the State's section 5 submission, the Attorney
General was addressing a "final ... administrative decision" regarding the practices the State intended to fol-
low beginning January 1, 1995. 28 C.ER. § 51.22 (1994). Indeed, Texas, like Mississippi, administratively
implemented the NVRA on a unitary basis through action of the Secretary of State, prior to action by the state
legislature. See U.S. Mot. For Prelim. Inj. and Summ. Judg., Attachment R (section 5 submission letter from
Texas Secretary of State, dated October 7, 1994).
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In any event, the State contradicted settled authority by arguing that the United
States Attorney General had the burden to inquire about the effect of the legisla-
tive committee's action and to "require[ ] a proper submission restricted only to
completed changes."7 " Section 5 places on the covered jurisdiction, not the U.S.
Attorney General, the burden of removing ambiguities and making a proper sec-
tion 5 submission. 7 That principle prevented the State from successfully twist-
ing the February 1, 1995, preclearance of the unitary NVRA plan into a grant of
preclearance for the dual registration system that was established through the
State's February 10, 1995, memorandum.
As mentioned above, the State's arguments also devoted a great deal of attention
to whether the Justice Department's preclearance of the unitary NVRA plan sub-
mitted by the Secretary of State could override state law by preventing the State
from maintaining its own separate system of registration for state and local elec-
tions. These arguments, the plaintiffs believed, tended to mischaracterize the
issue. No one ever alleged that the preclearance determination alone served to
change existing Mississippi law. A preclearance determination by the Justice
Department does not create or change state law but merely makes the precleared
practice, whether instituted administratively or by state statute, legally enforceable
under section 5. The plaintiffs did argue, however, that because the State itself
had decided to implement a unified NVRA plan administratively without awaiting
action by the state legislature, and because thousands of citizens actually regis-
tered during early 1995 under the clear assumption that they would be eligible for
all elections, the State had to seek section 5 preclearance before abandoning this
practice and removing all these voters from the registration rolls. Plaintiffs relied
upon a line of Supreme Court cases holding that the need for section 5 preclear-
ance of a new voting practice does not depend upon the legality or illegality under
state law of the practices previously in effect in the jurisdiction.77
In the leading case, Perkins v. Matthews, black voters sued to enjoin the City of
Canton, Mississippi, from implementing a change from a ward system to a sys-
tem of at-large aldermanic elections.78 The City argued that section 5 did not
apply because Canton's previous ward elections had been conducted contrary to a
1962 Mississippi statute requiring at-large aldermanic elections, and the change
to at-large elections was therefore necessary to conform Canton's procedures to
state law.79 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the City's previous use of
ward elections was "the procedure in fact 'in force or effect' in Canton" for pur-
poses of section 5.8' A change from that procedure was therefore a change
requiring preclearance under section 5, regardless of the illegality of ward elec-
tions under Mississippi law.
Similarly, in City of Lockhart v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
"Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength
75. Brief for Appellees at 32, Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997) (No. 95-2031).
76. Clark, 500 U.S. at 658-59; McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984).
77. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
78. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
79. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-36 (1942 & Supp. 1968).
80. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 395 (quoting section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970)).
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without regard for the legality under state law of the practices already in
effect."81 Plaintiffs argued that, under these precedents, the unified NVRA plan
had been "in force or effect"82 in Mississippi starting January 1, 1995, and that
the dual NVRA registration system implemented through the February 10, 1995,
memorandum therefore constituted a change as compared to the unified NVRA
plan." As noted above, however, this argument was not dispositive because the
dual NVRA plan constituted a change in voting procedures as compared to the
registration system in place in Mississippi prior to January 1, 1995, as well.
The parties presented their arguments to the three-judge district court through
cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs were completely unsuccess-
ful in persuading the district court that the State's actions had violated section 5,
and, on that issue, the district court unanimously granted summary judgment in
favor of the State.8" The district court started from the proposition that no unitary
NVRA plan had ever been authorized under state law. It concluded that the
instructions in the State's February 10, 1995, memorandum therefore should not
be considered changes but, instead, were merely corrections of previously unau-
thorized practices:
We hold that the February 10 letter did not effect a change subject to § 5 pre-
clearance. We hold that the state may correct a misapplication of its laws, which
by its conduct it has not ratified, without obtaining preclearance of the United
States Attorney General. Practically speaking, any other conclusion would be
absurd.8"
The district court also held that "the contents of the [submission] package
regarding only administrative decisions of the state have been precleared," 86
meaning that the Justice Department's February 1, 1995, preclearance letter
should be read as granting preclearance to NVRA procedures only for federal
elections. Finally, the court accepted the State's argument that adoption of a dual
registration system in response to an enactment of Congress did not reflect a
change covered by section 5 because Mississippi was merely complying with
federal law:
In short, it is the federal government that has created this system of dual regis-
tration, not the State of Mississippi. The State of Mississippi, therefore, in reg-
istering federal voters under the NVRA and in maintaining these records, is
simply performing a nondiscretionary act required by federal law, and thus the
state has not effected a change in its laws or practices subject to preclearance by
the United States Attorney General.87
81. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
83. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1235 (1997).
84. Young v. Fordice, No. 95-CV-197, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 1995).
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 12.
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The decision was a resounding rejection of the plaintiffs' claims. The district
court's opinion, however, had not discussed any of the Supreme Court precedents
on which the plaintiffs relied in support of their section 5 claim, and the plaintiffs
hoped that they could successfully appeal.
VII. THE SUPREME COURT APPEAL
Because section 5 enforcement actions are in the small category of cases still
brought before three-judge district courts, any appeal lies directly to the United
States Supreme Court, with no intermediate stop at the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. In such cases, parties file what is known as a jurisdictional state-
ment seeking review and argument in the Supreme Court, rather than a petition
for writ of certiorari. Technically, an appeal differs from a petition for certiorari
in that the Supreme Court's ruling on a jurisdictional statement constitutes a
decision on the merits, whether or not the Court sets the case for full briefing
and argument, whereas the Court's denial of a petition for writ of certiorari does
not constitute a decision on the merits of the lower court's decision." In practice,
however, the Court exercises discretion over its appellate docket in a manner
roughly similar to its management of the certiorari docket: it accepts only a lim-
ited percentage of direct appeals for full briefing and argument before the Court,
disposing of the remainder through summary affirmance or dismissal "for want
of a substantial federal question."'89
We believed there was a fair likelihood that the Supreme Court would agree to
hear our appeal because the Court historically has recognized very few excep-
tions to the section 5 preclearance requirement, because the rights of thousands
of registrants in Mississippi were at stake, and because the case presented an
important question concerning the construction of a new federal statute, the
NVRA.1' On October 1, 1996-just prior to the first Monday in October, the tra-
ditional start of the Supreme Court's term-the Court announced several cases in
which it would hear argument. Young v. Fordice was one of them.
That was the good news. The bad news was that, because the Court was eager
to fill its January argument calendar, the cases on the Court's October 1, 1996,
orders list were given expedited briefing schedules. That is how Young v. Fordice
became known around my house as "The Case that Ate Christmas." The schedule
called for the plaintiff-appellant's final brief (the reply brief) to be filed by 3:00
p.m. on December 27, with oral argument before the Supreme Court scheduled
88. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
89. ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 210-11 (7th ed. 1993).
90. Our confidence was shaken a bit when the United States, which had been a party in the district court,
decided at the last minute not to perfect its Supreme Court appeal. Despite the United States' decision, the
plaintiffs strongly believed that the district court's ruling, if not reversed, would open very harmful loopholes in
the coverage of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and we decided to go forward with our appeal. The Solicitor
General's office does not issue public explanations when it decides not to appeal an adverse ruling, and the
result was particularly inscrutable in this case, in light of the Solicitor General's later decision to file a brief
amicus curiae in the Supreme Court in support of the plaintiffs' appeal. In the end, the support of the United
States, even as amicus, was very valuable because of the United States' important role in enforcing section 5




for January 6, 1997. Whatever may be the practice in the lower federal courts,
one does not ask the Supreme Court for extensions to facilitate holiday plans.
A few fortunate and very skilled attorneys make a regular practice of arguing
before the Supreme Court. Most other lawyers who get the opportunity to argue
before the Court must rely upon a little bit of luck-having a case with the right
issue, at the right time, that will attract the Court's interest. I was in the latter
category and was arguing my first case before the Supreme Court. 1
My conclusion is that having a case before the Supreme Court is about the
most fun a lawyer can have. Admittedly, it was also, for me, a somewhat obses-
sive experience. There probably were not a great many days between October 1
and January 6 when I did not have the argument in the back-and often the
front-of my mind. I was keenly aware of the grilling that attorneys receive
from members of the Supreme Court because I had frequently attended Supreme
Court arguments in the many voting rights cases that the Court has heard over
the last five years or so. The members of the Court, while almost always polite
to arguing counsel, have become (based on my observations over the past few
years) ever more pitiless in pressing any weakness in an attorney's argument and
in jumping upon any concessions that counsel may make. Although it can be
sobering to observe the Justices' aggressive questioning and the occasional
humiliation suffered by attorneys at the hands of the Supreme Court, attending
these arguments was very helpful preparation. Being familiar with the awe-
inspiring courtroom, with the Court's somewhat imposing rituals, and even with
the questioning habits of individual Justices, somewhat dampened (but by no
means entirely removed) the anxiety surrounding the experience.
It is customary, and highly recommended, for attorneys to submit themselves
to one or more moot courts in advance of a Supreme Court argument. I had two.
I imposed upon some very talented voting rights attorneys and Supreme Court
advocates to hear my argument, fire questions at me, and then-most important
of all-tell me afterwards what the correct answers should be. I believe I was
more nervous in making my moot court arguments than in making the real one.
That is probably because I realized that my moot court "justices" would know
exactly what questions I was likely to dread the most, and would zero in on those
mercilessly. They did not disappoint me. Afterwards, however, they were all
quite generous in providing their advice about the case, while kindly hiding any
dismay they may have felt about my presentation. This part of the preparation
for a Supreme Court argument is fascinating, because one quickly sees the points
on which a consensus exists about the best approach, as well as the points that
evoke completely opposite reactions from different participants. For example,
9 1. In reporting on the experience of arguing a case before the Supreme Court, an article such as this risks
creating a false impression: that the Supreme Court argument is the most important moment in the case. Except
in rare circumstances, it is not. Of far more importance to the outcome of Young v. Fordice was the individual
plaintiffs' decision to demand vindication of their rights and their perseverance in pursuing the lawsuit despite
the many obstacles that were encountered. Further, the argument was secondary to the work of co-counsel in
developing the factual record and otherwise laying the groundwork in the trial court. The facts and arguments
that were ultimately presented to the Supreme Court-which are summarized in this article-were very much
the joint work of the plaintiffs and all the co-counsel in this case.
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after my first moot court, several of the judges were puzzled that I did not, in my
opening remarks, make reference to the 1987 district court ruling that found
Mississippi's prior dual registration system to be racially discriminatory. At my
second moot court, I tried working that in, but the judges were not impressed and
urged me to get to the heart of the legal issues more quickly. Part of the chal-
lenge in using moot courts to prepare for an argument lies in sifting the advice
you receive while ultimately applying your own judgment to decide what will
work and what will not.
When I stood to argue on behalf of the appellants, I managed to complete per-
haps three sentences of my planned presentation. At that point, Justices Scalia
and O'Connor broke in with questions, and I did not again, to the best of my rec-
ollection, look down to consult my notes during the remainder of the argument.
Justice O'Connor wanted to know whether appellants contended that the Justice
Department could object, under section 5, to Mississippi's implementation of the
NVRA for federal elections only. I responded that the Justice Department could
object under section 5, but only if it found that Mississippi's federal-election-
only plan was racially discriminatory in purpose or effect. I did not talk quickly
enough to succeed in elaborating on this point before other questions intervened.
Justices Scalia and O'Connor, joined from time to time by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, pressed the question of whether a federal-elec-
tion-only NVRA plan could violate section 5 when Congress had specifically
provided that the NVRA applied only to federal elections. Civil rights advocates
have learned to pay close attention to Justice O'Connor's questions at oral argu-
ment, because she is often the key swing vote in any divided decision in a civil
rights case. I was therefore concerned to see some of the most skeptical ques-
tions coming from Justice O'Connor.
Fortunately, the pace of the Justices' questions really did not provide time to
brood over the ultimate import of Justice O'Connor's views. I could only focus
on trying to respond to the Justices' questions while finding opportunities to
stress our most important points: that the State had made lots of discretionary
choices in implementing the NVRA, that these choices had the potential for
being racially discriminatory, and that the Court's precedents were squarely on
the side of requiring preclearance whenever a state makes changes in its voting
practices, regardless of the reason for the changes. I tried to emphasize a com-
pelling, concrete example of the problems created by Mississippi's system by
pointing out the misleading nature of the NVRA registration forms: the forms
strongly implied that voters were registering for all elections, even though they
were actually valid only for federal elections. This did seem to concern many of
the Justices. There also seemed to be a slight pause in the questioning-however
brief-when I described NVRA voters having to stand in separate lines on elec-
tion day and vote separate ballots because of their limited status.
By the time I sat down, I believe that all of the Justices, save Justice Thomas,
had joined in the questioning. As often happens in Supreme Court arguments, a
question posed by a Justice often appeared designed more as an answer to anoth-
er Justice's questions than as an inquiry to me. In my case, Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg and, to a lesser extent, Justices Breyer and Souter, posed a number of
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such sympathetic "questions." In such circumstances, counsel is expected to
respond by expressing her agreement with the premise of the question. I com-
plied with the prescribed ritual, feeling a bit of sympathy for the position of the
board in a game of ping-pong. Although I was fully aware of how humble my
role was in the drama, it was nevertheless an unforgettable thrill to be on the
stage at all.
No matter how exhilarating the experience of arguing before the Court, it is
frustrating when the red light goes on. An argument presents the only opportuni-
ty most attorneys will ever have to speak directly to the Justices about the merits
of an important issue-one, at least, very important to my clients and to voting
rights advocates throughout the country. The argument time, however, goes by
with lightning speed. Inevitably, one is left to contemplate the brilliant responses
that were not given. More specifically, I was concerned about the apparent skep-
ticism of several of the Justices concerning the breadth of the appellants' inter-
pretation of section 5.
There are some cases, however, in which the Court appears somewhat unhappy
with both sides during the argument, and ours was one. Justice O'Connor, who
had questioned me rather vigorously, also pressed my very able opponent about
the registration forms being given to NVRA registrants and why the forms did
not notify voters that their registration would be limited only to federal elections.
Even Justice Scalia-who rarely sides with a broad interpretation of civil rights
statutes-appeared to have some misgivings about the State's position. Justice
Ginsburg stressed what seemed to be an important concession made by the State
in its brief-the concession that at least some aspects of the State's NVRA plan
were required to be precleared. Few, if any, of the Justices appeared receptive to
the State's argument that the Justice Department's February 1, 1995, preclearance
letter should be read to grant preclearance to the dual system that was initiated
later by the State.
Waiting for the Supreme Court's decision is not the most enjoyable part of the
Supreme Court experience. When waiting for a decision from any other court,
one knows that a further appeal is still at least a theoretical possibility, should the
court fail to rule in one's favor. When the Supreme Court has taken your case
under advisement, no such comforting thought is available. Furthermore, the
stakes are high. Not only will one's clients be bitterly disappointed at a loss, but
so will everyone else whose rights may be restricted by an adverse Supreme
Court precedent. The anxiety is only enhanced by knowing that the Supreme
Court is the one court not truly bound by precedent. For example, we strongly
believed that the Supreme Court's seminal 1969 ruling in Allen v. State Board of
Elections92 should control the outcome of our case. But, when I cited one of
Allen's holdings in answer to a question from Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Chief
Justice indicated some dissatisfaction with the holding. Surely the Court could
not go back on Allen. "Or could it?" said a small nagging voice that I could
occasionally hear in the wee hours of the morning.
92. 393 U.S 544 (1969).
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As it turned out, the suspense was relatively brief. The Supreme Court issued
its decision on March 31, 1997, less than three months after the argument. The
decision, authored by Justice Breyer, was unanimous, which came as a pleasant
surprise in light of the grilling I had received from some of the Justices at oral
argument. The Court held that "Mississippi has not precleared, and must preclear,
the 'practices and procedures' that it sought to administer on and after February
10, 1995." 93 That was the principle from which the plaintiffs had started when
they filed their complaint almost two years earlier. Without belaboring the obvi-
ous, we were glad to see the principle set forth in a Supreme Court opinion.
The opinion reaffirmed the Court's prior holdings requiring section 5 review for
any change in voting practices or procedures-no matter how limited-that reflect-
ed policy choices by state officials, holding that "[i]nsofar as [the voting changes]
embody discretionary decisions that have a potential for discriminatory impact,
they are appropriate matters for review under § 5's preclearance process."94 To
illustrate the discriminatory potential of the State's NVRA procedures, Justice
Breyer cited the possibility of voter confusion as to registrants' eligibility for state
and local elections. The NVRA registration forms created by the State, according
to the Court, showed that this possibility was more than theoretical:
[B]y their lack of specificity, [the forms] probably would have led those vot-
ers-and the Attorney General-to believe that NVRA registration permitted
them to vote in all elections. These forms-perfectly understandable on the
"single registration" assumption-might well mislead if they cannot in fact be
used to register for state elections.95
While noting that the State's federal-election-only NVRA plan thus had the
clear potential for discrimination, the Court emphasized that the ultimate ques-
tion of whether the State's procedures were, in fact, discriminatory in their
impact or purpose was not within the jurisdiction of the local three-judge district
court but was reserved for the United States Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia.
9 6
The Court rejected one of the plaintiffs' arguments by holding that the State's
implementation of NVRA procedures on a unitary basis in early 1995 was not a
practice "in force or effect" for purposes of section 5 and thus did not become
part of the baseline against which to measure further changes in the State's prac-
tices.9 The Court reasoned that the unitary system, which the Court called the
"Provisional Plan," was not intended to be permanent unless the legislature
enacted NVRA legislation, that the plan was in place for only a few weeks, and
that no elections had been held while the unitary plan was in place. These fac-
93. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1239 (1997).
94. Id. at 1236.
95. Id. at 1237 (citations omitted). See also id. at 1237 (noting that state discretion in deciding what kind of
information to provide NVRA registrants concerning their ineligibility for state and local elections "makes
Mississippi's changes to the New System the kind of discretionary, nonministerial changes that call for federal
[Voting Rights Act] review").
96. Id. at 1239 (stating that a question of actual discriminatory impact or purpose "is an argument about the
merits").
97. Id. at 1235.
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tors, the Court concluded, distinguished this case from the circumstances
addressed in Perkins v. Matthews, in which an election system that was illegal
under state law was nevertheless deemed a practice "in force or effect" for pur-
poses of section 5.18 The Court concluded, however, that the legal status of the
unitary NVRA plan used in early 1995 did not change the outcome of the case,
because the State's federal-election-only NVRA plan reflected a change from the
procedures in effect prior to 1995." 9 In so concluding, the Court rejected
Mississippi's two major arguments against the application of section 5 to its fed-
eral-election-only NVRA plan.
First, the Court ruled that the State's December 1994 section 5 submission to
the United States Attorney General had failed to identify with specificity the fed-
eral-election-only nature of the NVRA plan the State ultimately implemented."'
The Court pointed out, for example, that "the submission included no instruc-
tions to voter registration officials about treating NVRA registrants differently
from other voters and provided for no notice to NVRA registrants that they could
not vote in state elections."1 1 The mere reference to the possibility of a dual reg-
istration system in one passage in the State's submission did not, the Court held,
provide adequate notice to the Attorney General that the State intended to imple-
ment a dual system in the absence of legislative action.0 2 Citing its holdings in
Clark v. Roemer and McCain v. Lybrand, the Court decisively rejected the State's
argument that preclearance of a dual registration system should be presumed
because the Attorney General could have made further inquiries to clarify the
State's intentions before acting on the State's section 5 submission.0 3 As the
Court explained:
[T]he issue, of course, is not whether [the Attorney General] should or should
not have issued a preclearance letter on February 1, 1995, but rather what it was
that she precleared. Her failure to seek added information makes it more likely,
not less likely, that she intended to preclear what she took to be the natural
import of the earlier submission, namely a proposal for a single state/federal
registration system.04
Second, the Court rejected Mississippi's argument that, by simply maintaining
its prior registration requirements for state and local elections, and implementing
the NVRA for federal elections as required by the NVRA, the State made no
changes in voting procedures subject to section 5 review. While acknowledging
that "the State has no choice but to [adopt the NVRA federal registration sys-
tem]" and that "a State's retention of a prior system for state elections, by itself,
is not a change," the Court held that implementing the NVRA involves discre-
tionary choices and thus requires preclearance."' As the Court explained:
98. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1971).
99. Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228, 1235 (1997).
100. Id. at 1237.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Clark v. Roemer 500 U.S. 646 (1991); McCain v. Lybrand 465 U.S. 236 (1984).
104. Young, 117 S. Ct. at 1238.
105. Id. at 1239.
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The problem for Mississippi is that preclearance typically requires examination
of discretionary changes in context - a context that includes history, purpose,
and practical effect. See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S., at 131
("The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the [changes], admittedly
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the 'preexisting' elements
of the council."). The appellants and the government argue that in context and
in light of their practical effects, the particular changes and the way in which
Mississippi administers them could have the "purpose [or] ... effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color...... We cannot say
whether or not that is so, for that is an argument about the merits. The question
here is "preclearance," and preclearance is necessary so that the appellants and
the Government will have the opportunity to find out if it is true.1"'
Accordingly, the Court directed that Mississippi must submit for preclearance
"the 'practices and procedures' that it sought to administer on and after February
10, 1995,"1'7 reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding the case
for implementation of an appropriate remedy. 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Young v. Fordice reaffirms the central role of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in protecting minority citizens against racial
discrimination in the electoral process. Shortly after Congress enacted section 5
in 1965, the Court insisted that section 5 must be given "the broadest possible
scope" to require preclearance of all changes in laws or practices affecting vot-
ing, even if they appear to be minor or innocent." 9 This expansive reading
accords with Congress' conclusion that case-by-case litigation was ineffective in
overcoming states' "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution,"
whereby new barriers to equal political participation were constantly being erect-
ed whenever an existing practice was struck down by the federal courts.1" The
requirement of preclearance for all changes affecting voting in covered jurisdic-
tions has served as a critical safeguard against racial discrimination in the elec-
toral process.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's repeated and forceful pronouncements
upholding a broad construction of section 5's scope, covered jurisdictions have
continually tested the federal courts' commitment to section 5 by arguing for
exemptions and by refusing to submit changes for preclearance even when
informed by the Justice Department that their failure to do so violates federal




109. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969).
110. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 334-35 (1966).
Ill. See, e.g., Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) (State of Louisiana refused to submit changes related to
state-court judicial elections for section 5 preclearance, despite Justice Department's longstanding objection to
unprecleared changes); NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comnn'n, 470 U.S. 166 (1985) (county election




intensify and could easily overwhelm the ability of the Justice Department and
private plaintiffs to enforce section 5, were the Supreme Court to signal any sig-
nificant retreat from its categorical requirement of preclearance for all changes
affecting voting. Because the circumstances in Young were somewhat unusual,
with the changes at issue having been prompted by the requirements of another
federal statute, the case could have offered an inviting target had the Supreme
Court been inclined to retreat from its past precedents and begin recognizing
exceptions to the preclearance requirement. The Court's refusal to do so in
Young is a clear reaffirmation of the continuing vitality of precedents first estab-
lished during a far more liberal era on the Court.
Indeed, by regularly noting jurisdiction and reversing cases where lower courts
have declined to enforce the section 5 preclearance requirement, the Supreme
Court has sent fairly strong signals that help discourage end runs around section
5 and promote uniform application of the law.112 The fact that several of these
decisions over the last few years, including Young v. Fordice, have been unani-
mous, is particularly striking given the deep divisions on the Court on other
issues involving race and the political process.
The subsequent history of Young v. Fordice underscores the importance of the
section 5 preclearance requirement, particularly as it applies to Mississippi.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Justice Department finally was able
to conduct its section 5 review of the State's dual NVRA registration procedures.
The evidence demonstrated serious racial disparities in the impact of the dual
registration requirement. These disparities took several forms but had the result
of disproportionately "preventing [African American citizens] ... from voting in
state and local elections." 1"3 The evidence showed, for example, that drivers'
license offices in Mississippi, a majority of whose visitors are white, have been
providing registrants with a choice of federal-election-only NVRA forms or state
mail-in forms that will make a voter eligible for all elections. The public assis-
tance agencies in Mississippi, however, which are also designated as NVRA reg-
istration sites, do not offer their clients the opportunity to register on state mail-
in forms but offer only the NVRA forms that result in eligibility for federal elec-
tions only. The majority of these clients are African American. 1 4 Thus, it
appears that the majority of those citizens relegated to the separate federal-elec-
tion-only poll lists are African American. Moreover, there is wide variation from
county to county in the type of notice given to NVRA registrants concerning
their limited status and in the opportunities that are offered to register separately
for state and local elections. ' As the Justice Department notes, "[s]everal of the
State's poorest counties with significant black populations appear to be among
those which have had the least success in registering NVRA voters for state elec-
112. In its 1996 Term alone, the Supreme Court issued three unanimous decisions overturning district court
decisions that had found the section 5 preclearance requirement inapplicable to particular voting changes. In
addition to Young v. Fordice, these were Lopez v. Monterey County, 117 S. Ct. 340 (1996), and Foreman v.
Dallas County, 117 S. Ct. 2357 (1997) (per curiam).
113. Letter dated September 22, 1997, from Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division, to Sandra M. Shelson, Special Assistant Attorney General, State of Mississippi, at 5.
114. Id. at 3-4.
115. Id. at 4-5.
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tions." 1"6 The end result of the dual NVRA system-just like the result of
Mississippi's prior dual registration system-is to "hamper[] the ability of black
persons to participate in the political process." 117 The open animus toward so-
called "welfare voters" expressed by some state officials also casts significant
doubt on the State's assertion that the dual NVRA plan was free of any racially
discriminatory purpose or effect." 8
As these facts about the operation of the dual NVRA system indicate, the
requirement of section 5 preclearance remains a critical tool in the effort to pro-
tect African American citizens in Mississippi from racial discrimination in the
exercise of their most fundamental right-the right to vote. Criticisms of section
5 as an intrusion on states' rights thus begs an important question: what do we
mean when we talk about "the State" whose rights should be preserved? If the
State is understood to include black citizens as well as white, the poor as well as
the well-off, then section 5 serves the State well by guarding against deprivations
of the basic rights of state citizenship. Extending the franchise as broadly as
possible does not endanger the State, but strengthens it. That straightforward
proposition probably best summarizes the perspective of the plaintiffs in Young v.
Fordice.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id.
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